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Abstract
Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover
tax on o¤shore investments. The US and UK, in particular, have implemented such
schemes in response to bulk acquisitions of information on o¤shore holdings, recent
examples of which are the Paradise and Panama papers. Schemes o¤er a¤ected
investors the opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced ne rates for
truthful disclosure. Might such incentives, once anticipated by investors, simply en-
courage evasion in the rst place? We characterize the investor/tax authority game
with and without a scheme, allowing for the possibility that some o¤shore investment
has legitimate economic motives. We show that a scheme increases net expected tax
revenue, decreases illegal o¤shore investment, increases onshore investment, but could
either increase or decrease legal o¤shore investment. The optimal disclosure scheme
o¤ers maximal incentives for truthful disclosure by imposing the minimum allowable
rate of ne.
JEL Classication: H26, D85.
Keywords: voluntary disclosure, o¤shore tax evasion, tax amnesty, third-party infor-
mation.
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1 Introduction
An estimated ten percent of world GDP is held in tax havens, much, though by no means all,
of which goes unreported (Alstadsæter et al. 2018; Zucman, 2013). The loss of tax receipts
due to o¤shore tax evasion by individuals in the United States (US) alone has been estimated
at $30-40 billion per annum (Gravelle, 2009). In recent years, data breaches have allowed tax
authorities around the world to acquire information on thousands of o¤shore investments. To
recover any tax owing on these investments, tax authorities have, in many instances, o¤ered
a¤ected investors a one-o¤ and time-limited opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure
through a bespoke facility giving overt incentives for honesty (usually in the form of a lower
ne rate). We term facilities of this form Incentivized O¤shore Voluntary Disclosure Schemes,
or just schemes. The net revenues arising from such schemes have been signicant: in 2009
a US scheme raised $3.4 billion (GAO, 2013) and a UK scheme netted nearly £500 million
(Treasury Committee, 2012: 14). The UK scheme is estimated to have cost £6 million
to administer (Committee of Public Accounts, 2008: 9), implying a return of 67:1. This
compares favorably with reported yield/cost ratios in the UK of around 8:1 for traditional
audit-based enforcement programs (HMRC, 2006).1
The advent of o¤shore data leakages, and the associated implementation of voluntary dis-
closure schemes, may have come as a surprise to holders of legacy investments, but such
developments are by now well understood by todays prospective o¤shore investors. Given
that such schemes are by now largely anticipated, this raises the question of whether the con-
tinued use of such schemes is gainful to tax authorities. In particular, in o¤ering incentives
for voluntary disclosure, might such schemes simply encourage illegal o¤shore investment in
the rst place  a concern pointed to by some recent empirical evidence. We shed light on
this concern.
In this paper we appraise the use of anticipated o¤shore disclosure schemes using game
theoretic tools. The model has two key features. First, we consider disclosure schemes that
are implemented retrospectively in response to an information leak, as we argue characterizes
practice in the UK and US. By the time of the information leak, however, the act of illegal
o¤shore evasion has already taken place. As it cannot inuence the illegal act retrospectively,
the best a tax authority can do is seek to recover any tax owed. The importance of this
observation lies in the fact that, in implementing incentivized schemes to recover e¢ciently
1The ratio of 8:1 is the estimated yield/cost ratio for self-assessment non-business enquiry work in 2005-06.
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tax owed from past evasion, the tax authority may inadvertently change the incentives for
future acts of o¤shore evasion. Second, we recognize that there can be legitimate economic
reasons for holding money in o¤shore accounts. Accordingly, not all investors who appear
in data on o¤shore holdings owe tax. Pritchard and Khan (2005), the only published work
we are aware of by tax authority insiders with unfettered access to the UK o¤shore data,
reports that even among those entities agged as the highest risk category in o¤shore data
only 70 percent were expected to owe tax.
Why invest o¤shore if not to evade tax? As well as potential pecuniary benets in the form
of higher pre-tax rates of interest than available onshore, o¤shore investments can also o¤er
legitimate tax advantages. Pension funds routinely invest via funds domiciled o¤shore, for
they enable investors from di¤erent countries to invest in the same fund, and can also legally
prevent instances of double taxation. Most major onshore hedge funds have an accompa-
nying o¤shore vehicle. For US based tax-exempt organizations, such vehicles provide some
legitimate relief from taxation of unrelated business income tax. As well as legitimate tax
advantages, o¤shore investments potentially o¤er a range of non-pecuniary benets: o¤shore
providers are known to o¤er greater convenience and sophistication, presumably as they face
lighter regulatory controls as compared with their onshore counterparts (Helm, 1997: 414).2
Recent leakages reveal that, in early 2000s, the Queen of the United Kingdom held around
£10 million of her private money o¤shore: such investments had no tax motivation as the
Queen is exempt from UK income and capital gains taxes. DEG, a development nance
institution wholly owned by the German state, is known to have used o¤shore accounts for
a number of years, citing non-pecuniary factors it utilized for legitimate operational pur-
poses.3 Professional poker players, and other individuals who must transact regularly in
many di¤erent currencies, are also known to make legitimate use of o¤shore bank accounts
(see OReilly, 2007).
In order to appraise the impact of anticipated disclosure schemes we rst model the strategic
interaction between investors and the tax authority in the absence of a scheme.4 We then
2Relative to their onshore counterparts in the US, Helm argues that o¤shore funds have greater exibility
and less procedural delays in changing the nature, structure, or operation of their products, and they face
fewer investment restrictions, short-term trading limitations, capital structure requirements, and governance
provisions. For evidence on the impact of these di¤erences on the behavior of onshore and o¤shore nancial
institutions see Kim and Wei (2002).
3See DEG (2015) wherein accounts held in Mauritius are disclosed on p. 57. For the operational justi-
cation see https://www.welt-sichten.org/artikel/32312/deg-ohne-offshore-geht-es-nicht.
4In this paper we focus solely on e¢ciency. There is, however, an equity concern when o¤ering incentives
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introduce a scheme into the model and compare the results. A investor can decide to invest an
exogenous lump-sum either onshore or o¤shore. An onshore investment must be made legally,
but an o¤shore investment may be made either legal or illegally. As such, not all investments
tax authorities observe in o¤shore data owe tax. If an investor invests o¤shore, the investment
is subsequently observed by the tax authority with a positive probability. In the absence of
a scheme, if an investors o¤shore investment is observed, the tax authority can, if it chooses,
verify whether any tax is owed, but at a cost. Following verication of a tax liability, the
tax authority can recover outstanding taxes and levy nes. An equilibrium of this game
is ine¢cient to the extent that the tax authority struggles to achieve a credible threat to
verify, owing to its inability to distinguish between legal and illegal o¤shore investments. In
the presence of a scheme, the tax authority chooses an incentivized ne rate that will apply
to liabilities disclosed within the scheme, and investors decide whether or not to make a
disclosure within the scheme. If an investor does make a disclosure they can either disclose
their o¤shore investment to be illegal and pay the tax owed plus a ne at the incentivized rate,
or disclose their investment as legal. The tax authority can choose to verify the investments
of those investors who disclose their o¤shore investment to be legal (for an illegal investment
might be falsely disclosed as legal). Even if an investor decides not to make a disclosure
within the scheme the tax authority can nevertheless choose to verify their investment and,
where appropriate, levy nes.
We nd that the introduction of a disclosure scheme induces fewer investors to invest o¤shore
illegally. Key to this nding is the idea that disclosure schemes induce endogenous decisions
by investors that act to lower the marginal cost of enforcement for tax authorities. Our
ndings imply that the number of investors investing onshore increases, but so too may
the number investing o¤shore legally. Thus, our model suggests that empirical evidence
pointing to increased o¤shore investment following the introduction of a scheme may not
be evidence that such schemes generate additional o¤shore evasion, but instead evidence
that such schemes generate additional legal o¤shore investment. Tax authorities also benet
from schemes: expected net revenue increases due to the additional voluntary compliance
that occurs when some investors switch from investing o¤shore illegally to investing legally.
Consistent with the design of schemes in the UK, the model predicts that the optimal scheme
to tax evaders. Moreover, only a subset of evaders (i.e., those that evade through an o¤shore investment)
benet. See, e.g., Bordignon (1993) and Rablen (2010) for studies of the role of equity in inuencing tax
evasion. There are also moral and legal concerns where information on o¤shore investments that was obtained
by illegal means has been purchased by tax authorities (see, e.g., Psterer, 2013).
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o¤ers the lowest allowable ne rate permitted in legislation for truthful disclosure within the
scheme.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the use and design of disclosure
schemes in the recovery of o¤shore tax evasion, and section 3 casts our contribution in the
context of the existing literature. Section 4 presents the model, which is developed in the
absence of a scheme in section 5, and in the presence of a scheme in section 6. Section 7 gives
a comparative analysis of the consequences of the introduction of a scheme for investment
behavior, welfare, and for tax revenue; and Section 8 concludes.
2 O¤shore Disclosure Schemes
Bulk leakages of o¤shore holdings data have in recent decades a¤ected investors in almost all
major economies: Table 1 in Langenmayr (2017), which summarizes and updates information
provided in OECD (2010), documents the use of o¤shore voluntary disclosure schemes to
address data leakages by 40 tax authorities worldwide. Leakages have occurred through
a number of channels. First, some tax authorities are aggressively exploiting legal powers
that impel private nancial institutions to release information relating to o¤shore holdings.
Second, tax authorities are cooperating with whistleblowers. For instance, a list of o¤shore
account holders of HSBCs Geneva branch  seized by French police in 2009  has been
the subject of investigation by tax authorities worldwide, as are further lists published by
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (the Paradise and Panama
papers) and the Center for Public Integrity (Center for Public Integrity, 2013).5 Third, tax
authorities are exploiting information arising from new legislation, such as occurred when
the 2003 European Savings Directive (European Union, 2003) came into force. Last, tax
authorities are taking steps to improve international cooperation through the signing of
tax information exchange agreements, with the G20 countries leading in this regard.6 The
creation in 2013 of an OECD Common Reporting Standard (OECD, 2013) and, in 2010, the
adoption in the US of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), are leading to
continuing information ows regarding o¤shore investments.7
5A subset of the former list is the so-called Lagarde List  which contains 1,991 names of Greeks with
accounts in Switzerland. It was passed to the Greek authorities in 2010 by the then French Finance Minister,
Christine Lagarde (Boesler, 2012).
6Within eight months of the G20 summit of April 2009 tax havens had signed more than 300 treaties
(Johannesen and Zucman, 2014). See Konrad and Stolper (2016) for a more general model of the problem
of coordinating against tax havens.
7For more on the economic impact of FATCA see Dharmapala (2016).
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Some tax authorities have opted to address data leakages through standing generic mecha-
nisms for voluntary disclosure, rather than implement bespoke o¤shore disclosure schemes.
According to Langenmayr (2017: Table 1) countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany
and Japan have utilized standing mechanisms  but countries such as France, Israel, the UK,
and the US, have opted for bespoke schemes. In these latter set of countries, the impetus
for each scheme may be traced to specic data leakages. For instance, one of the very rst
schemes, the 2007 O¤shore Disclosure Facility (ODF), was implemented in the UK following
legal action to force ve major UK banks to disclose details of the o¤shore accounts held
by their customers. The ODF o¤ered a¤ected investors time-limited access to a ten percent
ne rate (the minimum allowable penalty under UK civil legislation) if they made a full
disclosure.
In 2009 the IRS learned, via a whistleblower, details of the o¤shore accounts of a number
of US citizens with the Swiss bank UBS. In response, it launched the O¤shore Voluntary
Disclosure Program (OVDP) in the same year and later implemented the O¤shore Volun-
tary Disclosure Initiative in 2011.8 The UK implemented two schemes  the New Disclosure
Opportunity and the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility  in response to whistleblower infor-
mation relating to (i) 100 UK citizens with funds in Liechtenstein; and (ii) all British clients
of HSBC in Jersey (Watt et al., 2012). Following the signing of specic bilateral tax informa-
tion exchange agreements, the UK implemented the 2009 Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility,
and three further schemes aimed at its dependencies The Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey.
3 Literature Review
To our knowledge, the only theoretical analysis dedicated to o¤shore disclosure schemes is
found in Langenmayr (2017). In her model, the tax authority is a rst mover, deciding on
the incentivized ne rate before investors decide whether or not to evade tax. Treating the
tax authority as a rst mover is appropriate to modelling the implementation of schemes
in those countries which have chosen to handle o¤shore data acquisitions through stand-
ing generic mechanisms for voluntary disclosure. To our knowledge, however, no existing
analysis addresses practice in, e.g., the UK and US, which  as discussed previously have
implemented bespoke schemes in reaction to specic data leakages.9 We address this la-
8See Table 1 and Appendix II of GAO (2013) for a full account of the background to, and operation of,
these two schemes.
9In assuming the tax authority moves second, our model has similarities with, e.g., Graetz et al. (1986).
Di¤erent from this analysis, however, we assume that, for the tax authority to go to the trouble of performing
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cuna: in our analysis the tax authority is assumed to move after investors have made their
investment choice. This case is of interest as when the tax authority is endowed with the
advantage associated with moving rst an optimal scheme cannot lower net revenue, but
when the rst-mover advantage is handed to investors the desirability of such schemes is not
a priori obvious.
Two other di¤erences relative to Langenmayrs study are worthy of mention. First, Langen-
mayr nds the introduction of a scheme increases o¤shore tax evasion. This e¤ect arises at
the discretion of the tax authority as a consequence of its revenue maximizing strategy. That
is, in equilibrium, the tax authority permits an increase in evasion as the loss of revenue
through voluntary compliance is more than recouped through additional ne payments.10 In
our model the tax authority takes evasion behavior as xed, for it has already taken place
when the scheme is conceived. In this context, these apparently perverse incentives on the
part of the tax authority do not arise. Rather, we nd that the introduction of a scheme
unambiguously reduces illegal o¤shore evasion, albeit legal o¤shore investment could indeed
be increased by a scheme). Second, while Langenmayr makes the important point that dis-
closure schemes may reduce the per-investor verication cost (as the investor freely supplies
the necessary information) we show that a case for such schemes exists even neglecting this
consideration. Instead, we highlight how the design of a scheme reduces the number of
investments that must be veried. As a consequence, the marginal cost of increasing the
probability of verication falls, for this probability applies to a smaller base of investments.
Our analysis relates to a number of other literatures. We connect to a literature on the use
by tax authorities of pre-audit settlements in which investors can acquire full (e.g., Chu,
1990; Glen Ueng and Yang, 2001) or partial (Goerke, 2015) insurance from audit risk. These
settlements are shown to yield a Pareto improvement relative to random auditing as (i)
the tax authority captures the positive risk premium of a risk averse investor and (ii) the
tax authority conducts fewer random audits. Such audit settlement schemes, however, rely
on the tax authority moving rst, before the investor makes the evasion choice. They are,
therefore, not directly applicable in our framework. It is also notable that, even were we to
allow the tax authority to move rst, such settlement procedures would not induce a Pareto
improvement in our framework. We consider risk neutral investors, so the tax authority is not
verication, it must be strictly gainful in expectation. This leads to tax authority to adopt a pure strategy,
whereas Graetz et al. consider a mixed strategy for the tax authority.
10For another context in which a revenue-maximizing tax authority does not maximize voluntary compli-
ance see Rablen (2014).
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able to extract a positive risk premium; and we assume the tax authority audits optimally
with and without a scheme, which rules out random auditing. In particular, in our model
the tax authority does not gain from a reduction in the number of audits it performs per se,
as it only ever audits when it is strictly gainful in expectation to do so.
As our model examines both the initial decision by the investor to evade, as well as the
investors subsequent disclosure decision, it is closely associated with the literature investi-
gating anticipated tax amnesties, by which we mean voluntary disclosure schemes run in the
absence of new information, which nevertheless o¤er investors reduced penalties if they wish
to disclose an illegal o¤shore investment (see, e.g., Bayer et al. (2015) and the references
therein). Empirical evidence demonstrates clearly that there exists a signicant body of
investors who will not disclose under an amnesty who will disclose under a scheme, presum-
ably because the latter entails the credible threat of sanctions in the event of non-disclosure.
Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2018) document how participation in a pre-existing
Colombian mechanism for voluntary disclosure increased more than eightfold following the
publication of the Panama papers, while Johannesen et al. (2018) and Bethmann and Kvas-
nicka (2016) document similarly large e¤ects on the use of standing voluntary disclosure
mechanisms in the US and Germany respectively following o¤shore data leakages. Consis-
tent with this evidence, the investors in our model would never make a voluntary disclosure
in the absence of new information, but do make a disclosure when, following the receipt of
information, a scheme is o¤ered. Whereas the literature has cast doubt on the desirability
to tax authorities of anticipated amnesties, our analysis of voluntary disclosure schemes ar-
rives at more positive conclusions. An optimally designed scheme, even when anticipated,
increases net revenue and reduces illegal o¤shore evasion.
Our work also connects to the literature on law enforcement with self-reporting (e.g., Kaplow
and Shavell, 1994). In this literature truthful disclosure is induced by allowing those who
report to pay a sanction equal to the certainty equivalent of the expected sanctions they
would otherwise face by not self-reporting. The insights of Kaplow and Shavell are su¢-
cient to establish that, if a tax authority moves rst, then a scheme can always be made
unambiguously benecial: it can be chosen, for instance, to lower enforcement costs while
holding incentives to commit evasion xed. While our model also utilizes this insight, the
key di¤erence between our model and this literature is that the tax authority moves second,
after the crime is committed. In this setting it is unclear that the desirable properties of
self-reporting when the law enforcer moves rst are retained.
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A further related literature is that on optimal auditing in the presence of signals (e.g.,
Scotchmer, 1987; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2002; Bigio and Zilberman, 2011).
Under a scheme both the very act of making a disclosure, as well as its content, are signals
the tax authority observes before deciding whether to audit (verify). Last, as the ability of
tax authorities to extract revenue from whistleblower data inuences the degree to which
they should incentivize such behavior, our ndings inform the literature on the optimal
incentivization of whistleblowing (Yaniv, 2001) and complement studies that analyze the
e¤ects on compliance of the presence of potential whistleblowers (Mealem et al., 2010; Bazart
et al., 2014; Johannesen and Stolper, 2017).
4 Model
In this section we model o¤shore disclosure schemes as a strategic interaction between in-
vestors, who can invest either onshore or o¤shore, and the domestic tax authority.
Each investor i belonging to the set T receives a lump-sum wi > 0, unobserved by the
tax authority. The lump-sum is distributed across investors according to the function
W : [w,w] ∈ R>0 7→ (0, 1). Each investor should, by law, declare the lump-sum for taxation
at the marginal rate θ ∈ (0, 1). We assume, however, that investors have three possible
actions (i) invest the lump-sum o¤shore without declaring it for domestic taxation (illegal
o¤shore investment); (ii) declare the lump-sum for domestic taxation and invest the remain-
ing amount [1− θ]w o¤shore (legal o¤shore investment); or (iii) declare the lump-sum for
domestic taxation and invest the remainder onshore. In considering these actions we stress
that investing money o¤shore is not an illegal act: what makes an o¤shore investment illegal
in our model is the failure to previously declare the source capital for domestic taxation.
Amounts invested o¤shore earn a rate of return rOFF > 0, and amounts invested onshore
earn a rate of return rON > 0.11 Investors consume the investment (plus earned interest),
upon its maturity.
We shall assume, for simplicity, that interest income accruing from investment is untaxed.
That is, we focus on the evasion of tax on the source capital rather than the evasion (shelter-
ing) of interest income. As well as giving tractability, we note that the former is of greater
11In modelling {rON , rOFF } as exogenous positive constants, the model is agnostic as to the relative
magnitudes of these two quantities. Under additional assumptions regarding the separate structures of the
onshore and o¤shore industries, an arbitrage relationship might be postulated to endogeneously relate these
two quantities. Our results are robust to, but do not require, such an approach.
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economic signicance: the amount of source capital is typically many times the annual in-
terest ow such that only when undeclared interest has accrued over many years does the
tax liability from this source become of a comparable magnitude to that on the undeclared
capital.12
As discussed in the introduction, o¤shore investments may di¤er from onshore investments
both in the pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions. We capture the former dimension
through the separate rates of return, rON and rOFF ; and the latter dimension, for each
investor i, by a parameter bi > 0, where bi < 1 signies that the non-pecuniary benets
to i from investing o¤shore exceed those from investing onshore, while bi > 1 signies the
reverse. bi is independent of wi, and is distributed across investors according to the function
B : R>0 7→ (0, 1].
An o¤shore investment (legal or illegal) is subsequently observed by the tax authority with
probability p ∈ (0, 1). In the long run, p is endogenous to the e¤orts of tax authorities in,
e.g., improving international cooperation and incentivizing whistleblowing. In the short-run,
however, tax authorities must take p as xed, as we shall suppose.
The underlying inference problem for the tax authority is as follows: if it observes an o¤shore
investment of amount y, this could be the illegal investment of an investor with lump-
sum w = y or the legal investment of an investor with lump-sum w = y/ [1− θ]. While
the simplicity of our model confers many advantages, one disadvantage is that it might
lead the reader to underestimate the practical complexities to a tax authority of making
this inference: investors a¤ected by o¤shore schemes are, in most cases, high net-worth
individuals with often extremely complex nancial arrangements, frequently involving the
use of intermediary trust structures that make even mapping investments to their true
owners a prolonged and labor-intensive process. For this demographic, the idea that the
lump-sum  even when declared  will appear in a transparent and separately itemized form
within the tax return for a known individual in a known tax year is in most cases unduly
optimistic. Rather  as evidenced by the fact that tax authorities are routinely observed to
seek external information from both the a¤ected taxpayer and other nancial institutions 
tax authorities are typically unable to verify the legality of an investment solely on the basis
of their internal information. Moreover, even once the lump-sum has been pinpointed, its
nature (e.g., bequest, income, capital gain) must be established to verify that the correct tax
12See, e.g., Pritchard and Khan (2005) for a detailed discussion and empirical evidence on this point.
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(inheritance, income, or capital gains tax) was applied. Bearing these points in mind, we
therefore suppose the tax authority must sink a verication cost c > 0 to reveal the nature
of an o¤shore investment.13
If a tax liability is veried, the tax authority can levy a ne on the undeclared tax at a
rate f ∈ [f, f ], where these upper and lower bounds are interpreted as being specied in
legislation. Standard arguments (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, 1994) ensure that a revenue-
maximizing tax authority will choose f = f . At the ne rate f , the amount an investor
must pay in tax and nes on a veried illegal investment y is denoted by
Q(f, y) = θ[1 + f ]y. (1)
To simplify aspects of the analysis we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Q
 
f, w

> c.
Assumption 2 p[1 + f ] > 1 > p[1 + f ].
Assumption 1 may be interpreted as requiring the lump-sum w to be su¢ciently large that
it is gainful for the tax authority to verify an illegal o¤shore investment. Empirically, this
assumption is very likely satised, for observed o¤shore investments are typically large.14
Moreover, to the extent that some observed o¤shore holdings are too small to be worthwhile
investigating, such holdings can be screened almost costlessly by the tax authority. Assump-
tion 2 implies that, at the maximum ne rate, f , it is not gainful (in expectation) to invest
o¤shore illegally if the tax authority, conditional on observing the investment, will verify with
certainty. Conversely, at the minimum ne rate specied under legislation, f , it is gainful to
invest o¤shore illegally even if, conditional on observing the investment, the tax authority
will verify with certainty. If the former inequality is not satised, illegal o¤shore investment
is a one-way bet, for it pays even when the tax authoritys enforcement is maximal. If the
13In our analysis, the cost c applies always, irrespective of whether an investor makes a voluntary disclosure.
In Langenmayr (2017), by contrast, verication is assumed to cost the tax authority less if the investor makes
a voluntary disclosure. As this alternative assumption  which can be readily be introduced into our model
 adds to the case for disclosure schemes, it only strengthens our results when adopted.
14According to Watt et al. (2012), the list of HSBC Jersey account holders obtained by HMRC in 2012
identies 4,388 people holding £699 million in o¤shore current accounts, which implies an average holding
of £159,000. The median account balance of more than 10,000 closed cases from the 2009 OVDP in the US
is reported as $570,000 in GAO (2013).
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latter inequality is not met, the tax authoritys enforcement is so strong that it can eliminate
all o¤shore investment in the presence of a scheme. Note that Assumption 2 rules out the
pure amnesty case p = 0 in which there is no threat that an illegal o¤shore investment will
subsequently be observed.
Investors behave so as to maximize expected consumption, while the tax authority behaves
so as to maximize revenue (comprising voluntary compliance, recovered tax, and nes) net
of enforcement costs. While the implied risk neutrality of the tax authority is standard, the
risk neutrality of investors might seem restrictive. Allowing for risk averse investors can only
strengthen the case for voluntary disclosure schemes, however. In the absence of a scheme,
risk averse investors would pay a premium to insure against the risk associated with possible
tax authority verication. When a scheme is o¤ered, however, investors can avoid uncertain
verication by disclosing truthfully. In this way the tax authority is able to capture the
investors risk premium within the scheme. To establish an economic case for the use of such
schemes it is therefore su¢cient to examine the risk neutral case.
For simplicity, we de-emphasize intertemporal considerations by assuming a time preference
rate of unity (for both investors and the tax authority).15 Denote the expected consumption
from choosing an investment of type k as Ck, where k = ON is for onshore investment,
k = L is for legal o¤shore investment, and k = I is for illegal o¤shore investment. We may
then partition the set T into those investors that invest onshore, o¤shore legally, and o¤shore
illegally, T = TON ∪ TOFF = TON ∪ TI ∪ TL, where
TON = i : CON ≥ max {CL, CI} ; TOFF = i : CON < max {CL, CI} ;
TL = i ∈ TOFF : CL ≥ CI ; TI = i ∈ TOFF : CL < CI .
Conditional on having chosen to invest o¤shore, the probability that an investor who has
invested an amount y chooses to do so illegally is denoted φ = φ (y) ∈ [0, 1]. When the tax
authority chooses its enforcement parameters φ (y) is already determined, though its value
is not observed by the tax authority. We suppose, however, that the tax authority forms a
(rational) expectation of this quantity, ~φ (y), satisfying E(~φ (y)) = φ (y).
15To the extent that tax authorities do care about the timing of tax receipts, not just their level, our
results suggest implementation of schemes is benecial. This arises as we nd schemes to increase voluntary
compliance, implying that more tax is paid at the time the investment is made.
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5 No Scheme
In order to appraise the use of disclosure schemes, we now model the do nothing benchmark
case in which the tax authority does not o¤er a scheme (NS). The game in the absence of
a scheme is set out in Figure 1. At the outset, nature determines each investors lump-
sum, wi, and his/her level of non-pecuniary benet, bi, but this action is unobserved by the
tax authority. Next, investors make an investment choice as described previously. O¤shore
investors have their investment subsequently observed by the tax authority with probability
p ∈ (0, 1).16 The distribution function of observed o¤shore investments is denoted by Y ().
If o¤shore holdings are not observed by the tax authority, any illegal o¤shore investment goes
undetected with probability one, and the game ends. If o¤shore holdings are observed by the
tax authority, it will verify each o¤shore investment with a probability α ∈ [0, 1]. Veried
undeclared liabilities are ned at the rate f . It follows that expected investor consumption
is given by
CON = [bi + rON ] [1− θ]w; (2)
CL = [1 + rOFF ] [1− θ]w; (3)
CI = [1 + rOFF ]

w − pαQ(f, w)

; (4)
where implicit in this formulation is that an investor holding an illegal o¤shore investment
must repatriate some of their investment to meet the tax and nes payable as a result of
verication, and therefore do not earn interest on this amount. Note from (2) and (3) that
if rON = rOFF and bi = 1 then an investor is exactly indi¤erent between a legal o¤shore
investment and an onshore investment. More generally, the balance of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary benets favors a legal o¤shore investment when rOFF − rON > bi − 1.
Figure 1  see p. 29
16We assume here, for simplicity, that the tax authority acquires o¤shore data at zero cost, as was indeed
the case in many of the schemes discussed in the Introduction. Even when payments were made, the amounts
involved  where known  appear relatively modest in relation to the revenue generated. Bradley Birkenfeld,
a UBS employee who acted as an IRS informer, received a payment of $104 million, but in the context of
some $3.4 billion that was eventually raised by the resulting scheme (GAO, 2013). The UK tax authority is
reported to have paid a former Liechtenstein bank employee a fee of just £100,000 for information regarding
more than £100 million of o¤shore funds (Oates, 2008). Clearly, however, any amount paid to acquire
information must be set against any revenue accruing from the scheme.
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The expected net revenue the tax authority will generate from the members of T is given
by:
RT (α;φ) =
Z Z
TON∪TL
θw dWdB + pROFF (α;φ) , (5)
where the rst term is the revenue generated through voluntary compliance, and the second
term,
ROFF (α;φ) =
Z Z
TOFF

φα

Q(f, y)− c

− [1− φ]αc
	
dY dB,
is the expected net revenue from verifying investors in OFF . Importantly, however, the tax
authority only observes ex-post the realized investment amount y of each member of the set
TOFF . It therefore takes as xed the level of voluntary compliance, the total size of the set
TOFF , and the decomposition of TOFF between investors who have invested o¤shore legally
and illegally. Accordingly, choosing α to maximize RT (α;φ) becomes simply equivalent to
choosing α to maximize ROFF (α;φ), i.e., the net revenue from verifying the investments of
investors in TOFF . Di¤erentiating ROFF (α;φ) with respect to α we obtain
∂ROFF (α;φ)
∂α
=
Z Z
TOFF

φQ(f, y)− c

dY dB.
Hence, when observing an o¤shore investment of amount y, the tax authority chooses
α (y;φ) =
(
0 if φ ≤ c
Q(f,y)
;
1 otherwise;
(6)
where here we adopt the convention that, if the tax authority is indi¤erent between verifying
and not-verifying, it does not verify. Equation (6) captures an important intuition of the
model: if the propensity to invest o¤shore illegally, φ, is su¢ciently high then the tax
authority will always choose to verify (α = 1). If, however, φ, is su¢ciently low that the
expected gain from verication, φQ(f, y)− c, falls to (or below) zero, the tax authority does
not nd it gainful to verify an observed o¤shore investment, hence α = 0. As shall become
clear, the discreteness of the tax authoritys verication strategy induces some risk neutral
investors to commit o¤shore evasion probabilistically as part of a mixed strategy.
It follows from (6) that expected consumption, conditional on choosing to invest o¤shore,
can be written as
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CNSOFF (φ,w) =
(
[1 + rOFF ] {φw + [1− φ] [1− θ]w} if φ ≤ cQ(f,w) ;
[1 + rOFF ]

φ

w − pQ(f, w)

+ [1− φ] [1− θ]w
	
otherwise.
(7)
We depict CNSOFF (φ,w) in Figure 2. We see that, when φ ≤ c/Q(f, w) the investors payo¤
in (7) is strictly increasing in φ for, from (6), the tax authority will choose not to verify.
Immediately above φ = c/Q(f, w) the payo¤ CNSOFF jumps downward discretely, however, for
at this higher level of φ the tax authority will verify. As a consequence of Assumption 2,
once the tax authority can commit to verify, it is no longer gainful in expectation to invest
o¤shore illegally. Accordingly, increases in φ above c/Q(f, w) are seen in Figure 2 to only
reduce the payo¤ CNSOFF further. Thus, C
NS
OFF is maximized with respect to φ where
φ (w) =
c
Q(f, w)
, (8)
at which point the tax authority is exactly indi¤erent between verifying and not-verifying.
Figure 2  see p. 30
Substituting (8) into (7) we obtain
CNSOFF (w) = [1 + rOFF ]
c+ [1− θ] [1 + f ]w
1 + f
. (9)
The payo¤ in (9) to investing o¤shore is strictly preferred to the payo¤ from investing onshore
in (2) if
b <
CNSOFF (w)
[1− θ]w
− rON ≡ ~b
NS (w) .
Proposition 1 In the absence of a scheme, if bi < ~b
NS (wi) an investor i ∈ T invests
o¤shore illegally with probability c
Q(f,wi)
and o¤shore legally with probability
Q(f,wi)−c
Q(f,wi)
; and
invests onshore with probability one otherwise.
A hallmark of the equilibrium outcome is that, owing to its inability to distinguish between
legal and illegal o¤shore investments, the tax authority is only able to cap the propensity
for illegal o¤shore investment at φ (wi) = c/Q(f, wi). Below this propensity it is unable to
sustain a credible verication threat.
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6 The Scheme
We now suppose the tax authority o¤ers a scheme in the event that o¤shore investments
are observed. The game is set out in Figure 3. The initial hidden action by nature and
the subsequent investment decision are modelled in the same way as in the absence of a
scheme. If o¤shore investments are observed, however, the tax authority chooses the terms
of a scheme it then announces to investors.17,18 Investors then choose either to enter or
not-enter the scheme. If the investor enters s/he discloses a type d ∈ {L, I}. An investor
disclosing d = I (illegal) accompanies their disclosure with a payment to the tax authority
of Q(fS, y), where fS ∈ [f, f ] is termed the incentivized ne rate. An investor disclosing
d = L (legal) makes no accompanying payment. The tax authority veries the disclosure
d = L with probability αS ∈ [0, 1] and never veries the disclosure d = I. Verication reveals
the nature of an o¤shore investment with certainty: if the tax authority nds an investor to
have disclosed falsely it levies a ne at the (maximum) rate f . When an investor chooses to
not-enter the scheme the tax authority veries their investment with probability αO ∈ [0, 1].
If an illegal investment is veried, the investor is ned at the rate fO ∈ [f, f ]. Standard
arguments ensure that the tax authority will set fO = f .
Figure 3  see p. 30
Owing to the revelation principle, attention may be conned to schemes (mechanisms) in
which investors disclose truthfully. Consider the subgame that arises when an investor enters
the scheme. If an investment is illegal, falsely disclosing d = L results in an expected payment
of αSQ(f, y), whereas disclosing d = I results in a sure payment of Q(fS, y). Hence truthful
17Thus the investor faces uncertainty as to whether their investment will be observed, but know a scheme
will be o¤ered if the investment will be observed. The model can be generalized to allow the tax authority
to implement a scheme with a given probability in the event that information is observed. As, however, this
probability turns out to be exactly one in equilibrium we omit this step without loss of generality.
18In practice a tax authority may also face a second choice as to the set of investors with whom it
communicates the scheme. For instance, prior to the OVDP in the US, the Swiss authorities agreed to hand
the IRS the names of approximately 4,450 US clients with accounts at UBS. The IRS then had the choice
of (i) requiring UBS to write to a¤ected clients informing them that the details of their o¤shore holding had
been handed to the IRS; or (ii) requiring UBS to write to a wider set of its clients (up to the set of all UBS
clients with o¤shore holdings) informing them that the details of their o¤shore holding might have been
handed to the IRS. In actuality, the IRS chose the second option, and  to prevent investors from inferring
whether their information had been handed over  negotiated a condentiality clause with the Swiss that
concealed the criteria by which the accounts were selected until after the OVDP deadline had passed (GAO,
2013). We abstract from this issue here, but note it as a potentially interesting avenue for future research.
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disclosure requires fS to satisfy Q(fS, y) ≤ αSQ(f, y).19 As, in equilibrium, the tax authority
will never nd it optimal to set fS below that required to achieve truthful disclosure, it follows
that
Q(fS, y) = αSQ(f, y). (10)
If it observes the set of o¤shore investments the tax authority chooses the parameters of the
scheme, {αS, fS}, as well as the analogous parameters for investors who choose to not-enter
the scheme {αO, fO}, to maximize the expected net revenue raised from investors belonging
to TOFF .
An investor with an illegal o¤shore investment faces a sure payment Q(fS, w) = αSQ(f, w)
if they enter the scheme, and an expected payment αOQ(f, w) if they choose to not-enter.
We assume that, in the case of perfect indi¤erence, investors enter the scheme. Accordingly,
an investor with an illegal o¤shore investment will enter the scheme if αO ≥ αS. An investor
with a legal o¤shore investment is indi¤erent between entering and not-entering the scheme,
so will enter also.
To emphasize a key intuition of the model we focus on the case in which investors choose to
enter the scheme (αO ≥ αS), in which case  and using the equality in (10)  expected net
revenue generated within the scheme isZ Z
TOFF
φαSQ(f, y)− [1− φ]αSc dY dB. (11)
Focusing on the second term in the integral in (11), which is the cost of verication, note
that the verication probability αS applies only to the proportion 1−φ of o¤shore investors
who have chosen to invest o¤shore legally, and therefore disclose d = L (the remaining
proportion φ of o¤shore investors who invest illegally truthfully disclose d = I). Conversely,
in the absence of a scheme, the verication probability α applies to all o¤shore investors.
Verication costs therefore fall by a factor [1− φ] as fewer investments need to be veried.
A consequence of this observation is that the marginal cost of increasing the verication
probability also falls by a factor [1− φ] under a scheme. As we shall see, this generates a set
of values of φ for which the tax authority is able to maintain a credible verication threat
in the presence of a scheme, but is unable in the absence of a scheme.
19If an o¤shore investment is legal, falsely disclosing d = I results in a sure loss of [1− θ]Q(f^ , y), whereas
disclosing d = L results in no loss. Hence, truthful disclosure by investors in TL is assured in equilibrium.
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Establishing the equilibrium of the game in the presence of a scheme proceeds through the
same set of steps as performed in Section 5. Matters are made more complicated, however,
by the existence of two distinct verication probabilities {αO, αS} that are chosen by the tax
authority simultaneously. Taxpayers again invest so as to make the tax authority indi¤erent
between verifying and not-verifying, but  in light of the discussion above  this now occurs
at a new threshold given by
φS (w) =
c
c+Q(f, w)
. (12)
Relegating the proof to the Appendix, we arrive at the following:
Proposition 2 In the presence of a scheme, if bi < ~b
S (wi) an investor i ∈ T invests o¤shore
illegally with probability c
c+Q(f,wi)
, and o¤shore legally with probability
Q(f,wi)
c+Q(f,wi)
; and invests
onshore with probability one otherwise.
7 Analysis
7.1 Verication
A result that underlies all of the remaining ndings we shall present is that the introduction
of a scheme enhances the ability of the tax authority to sustain a credible threat to verify,
leading to a lower threshold value of φ at which the tax authority becomes indi¤erent between
verifying and not-verifying:
Proposition 3 φS (w) < φNS (w) .
The underlying intuition for Proposition 3 is that, as noted previously, a scheme lowers the
marginal cost of raising the verication probability above zero. In particular, an increase
in φ applies only to o¤shore investors who disclose d = L, whereas it applies to all o¤shore
investors in the absence of a scheme. To ensure that verication is not gainful in expectation
for the tax authority, investors therefore become obliged to invest o¤shore illegally with a
lower probability.
7.2 Investment and Evasion  Onshore and O¤shore
By comparing the respective equilibria in the absence (Proposition 1) and presence (Propo-
sition 2) of a scheme, we now analyze the consequences of introducing a scheme for both
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onshore and o¤shore investment volumes, and for the decomposition of o¤shore investments
between those that are legal, and those that are illegal.
Let us denote the expected proportion of investors choosing an investment typem ∈ {ON,L, I}
as
T km, where k ∈ {NS, S}. Similarly, let mk denote the expected aggregate level of in-
vestment type m.
Proposition 4
(i)
T SOFF  < TNSOFF  and T SON  > TNSON  ;
(ii)
T SI  < TNSI  but T SL  ≷ TNSL  ;
(iii)
OFF S < OFFNS and ONS > ONNS ;
(iv)
OFF SI  < OFFNSI  but OFF SL  ≷ OFFNSL  .
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4 focus on the proportion of investors who invest o¤shore
with and without a scheme. The proof of part (i) demonstrates that the enhanced verication
threat present under a scheme causes a fall in the critical level of relative non-pecuniary ben-
ets required to induce investors to invest onshore, i.e., ~bS (w) < ~bNS (w). This implies that
the introduction of a scheme induces a set of investors  those with characteristics belonging
to the shaded set in Figure 4  to switch from investing o¤shore to investing onshore.20 Ac-
cording to part (ii), the introduction of a scheme also unambiguously reduces the proportion
of investors who invest o¤shore illegally. As, however, both TOFF and TI shrink, the propor-
tion of investors who invest o¤shore legally could either increase or decrease. In particular,
if TI shrinks proportionately more than does TOFF , then TL expands. Parts (iii) and (iv) of
Proposition 4 show that analogous results to those in parts (i) and (ii) hold also for aggregate
investment. In part (iii) the introduction of a scheme causes aggregate investment to fall 
simply because some investors switch from investing w o¤shore illegally, to instead investing
the reduced amount [1− θ]w onshore legally. The fall of total investment, coupled with
an increase of onshore investment, implies that o¤shore component of investment must fall.
While the illegal component of o¤shore investment falls, the legal component may increase
or decrease.
20The restriction that the density function B () takes strictly positive values for w > 0 ensures that there
will always exist a positive mass of investors belonging to the shaded space indicated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4  see p. 31
The possibility that the legal component of o¤shore investment could be observed to increase
following the introduction of a scheme is consistent with the evidence of Langenmayr (2017),
who observes an increase in o¢cially recorded o¤shore investments by US citizens following
the introduction of the 2009 OVDP. Within Langenmayrs framework  which does not allow
for legal o¤shore investment  an increase in o¤shore investment can only be interpreted as
an increase in illegal o¤shore evasion. Our model, which allows for legal o¤shore investment
for legitimate economic purposes, o¤ers an alternative interpretation of this nding.
7.3 Tax Revenue
Does the introduction of a scheme increase the expected net revenue of the tax authority?
Proposition 5 The expected net revenue collected by the tax authority from the set of in-
vestors T is increased by the introduction of a scheme: RST > R
NS
T .
The intuition for Proposition 5 is that the increased propensity to invest legally raises the
level of voluntary compliance. This increase in expected revenue from voluntary compliance
is not o¤set by lower net revenues arising on amounts disclosed within the scheme (on account
of the lower incentivized ne rate being applied), for  both with and without a scheme 
the rst-mover advantage enjoyed by investors permits them to make choices that leave the
tax authority just indi¤erent between verifying and not-verifying. When this occurs the
expected yield in tax and nes from verication is exactly o¤set by its cost.
Were we to have assumed that the tax authority could choose the scheme parameters be-
fore investors make their investment choice, the nding that net revenue increases under a
scheme would be unsurprising. As, however, we take the tax authority to move second, the
implications for net revenue were initially uncertain. It is notable, therefore, that even when
moving second, voluntary disclosure schemes still increase net revenue.21
21Whereas we consider a tax authority unfettered in its choice of ne rate from the interval [f, f ], in many
cases it is only in prescribed circumstances that the tax authority can levy the highest allowable ne rate.
In the UK, for instance, the ne rate that is applied is conditional upon the behavioral nature of the
observed non-compliance: the lower bound applies if the non-compliance is judged to be through careless
error, whereas the upper bound applies to deliberate and concealed inaccuracies (HMRC, 2012). A
further potential benet of schemes, therefore, is that they may provide the legal grounds to apply a higher
rate in cases where an investor either fails to respond to a disclosure opportunity, or makes a false disclosure
within the scheme.
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7.4 Investor Welfare
We now examine the impact of a scheme for expected investor consumption (utility):
Proposition 6 For investors belonging to
(i) TNSON ∪ T
S
ON , C
NS = CS;
(ii) TNSOFF ∪ T
S
OFF , C
NS > CS;
(iii) TNSOFF ∪ T
S
ON , C
NS > CS.
Part (i) of Proposition 6 is for investors who invest onshore irrespective of the provision of
a scheme: such investors are wholly una¤ected. Part (ii) states that investors who invest
o¤shore irrespective of the provision of a scheme lose consumption in the presence of a
scheme. This loss arises as the probability φS that an o¤shore investor chooses to invest
illegally is lower in the presence of a scheme. Thus, the investor loses expected consumption
on account of paying tax on the lump-sum with a greater probability. Part (iii) is for investors
for whom the introduction of a scheme induces a switch from investing o¤shore to investing
onshore. Such investors move from the higher payo¤ CNSOFF in the absence of a scheme to the
lower payo¤ CON in the presence of a scheme (continuing to invest o¤shore would yield the
still lower payo¤ CSOFF < CON). That those investing o¤shore illegally lose utility appears
desirable  after all, it is a consequence of a reduction in incentives for breaking tax law.
More generally, were we to model explicitly the benets from taxation in the form of the
public services it pays for, the increased tax revenue generated by schemes would generate
utility for all investors through increased provision.
7.5 Optimal Incentivized Fine Rate
For tax authorities seeking to understand the optimal design of disclosure schemes it is of
interest to highlight a feature of the optimal scheme relating to the question of how to set
the incentivized ne rate for those that enter the scheme. We have the following result:
Proposition 7 In the optimal scheme it holds that fS = f.
According to Proposition 7, the incentivized ne rate is the lowest ne rate allowed under
legislation. This is consistent with the design of disclosure schemes in the UK, which have
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o¤ered those who disclose the minimum ten percent penalty permitted in law. The Nether-
lands  which implemented bespoke schemes in 2009 and 2013  has a minimum ne of zero
(f = 0), and, consistent with our nding, implemented its schemes on a no-ne basis. The re-
sult in Proposition 7 may initially seem surprising as choosing a lower ne rate would seem to
reduce net revenue through a reduction in ne revenue. This is not so, however, for although
ne revenue indeed falls, net revenue is left unchanged. Lowering the incentivized ne rate
makes truthful disclosure more attractive to investors, meaning that the tax authority can
achieve truthful disclosure with less verication. The reduction in verication costs achieved
in this way exactly o¤sets the loss in ne revenue (as a consequence of the tax authority
being indi¤erent between verifying and not-verifying), leaving net revenue constant. In this
way, the same level of net revenue is achieved with least verication activity by setting the
incentivized ne rate minimally.22
8 Conclusion
Tax authorities around the world are using incentivized voluntary disclosure schemes to
recover tax on o¤shore investments. Such schemes o¤er discounted ne rates for those who
voluntarily disclose (albeit in the shadow of subsequent enforcement against those who do
not). International initiatives such as the OECD Common Reporting Standard are expected
to result in their continued use. As, however, the use of such schemes by tax authorities
in response to data leakages is by now anticipated, the stellar returns observed for the
earliest such schemes should not be expected to continue. As our model highlights, rational
investors who anticipate being o¤ered a scheme behave in a such a manner as to make the
tax authority indi¤erent between verifying o¤shore investments and not. In this paper we
examined whether indeed such anticipated schemes continue to be of value to tax authorities,
or could actually be incentivizing o¤shore evasion in the rst place.
We consider an environment in which investors can invest a lump-sum onshore or o¤shore.
Should they choose to invest o¤shore, they may do so legally or illegally  neither is o¤-
shore investment in itself illegal, nor is all o¤shore investment driven by illegal tax motives.
After investments have been made, the tax authority may potentially observe the o¤shore
investments, but does not observe which were made legally, and which illegally. Investors
22A further factor that might account for the use of the minimum ne rate, albeit one that lies outside of
our model, is the salience to investor of a low headline incentivized ne rate. For nascent studies of taxpayer
salience see, e.g., Chetty et al. (2009) and Krishna and Slemrod (2003).
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make their investment decision knowing that, if they invest o¤shore and the investment is
subsequently observed a scheme will be o¤ered. The terms of the scheme, however, are de-
termined only after the investment is observed, as we have argued characterizes the schemes
operated in the UK, US and elsewhere.
In this context, we nd that the tax authority can increase its expected net revenue by
implementing a disclosure scheme, rather than by simply using its regular verication regime.
A hallmark of the optimal disclosure scheme is that it o¤ers the minimum allowable ne rate
in law to those that disclose truthfully. The particular benet the implementation of a
scheme a¤ords tax authorities in our model is a reduction in the base of investments that
require costly verication. This lowers the marginal cost of verication, permitting the tax
authority to present investors with a stronger threat to enforce the tax law. Although the
implementation of disclosure schemes is consistent with a rise in legal o¤shore investment,
importantly our model predicts that the illegal component of o¤shore investment always falls.
Thus, in a sense our model helps makes precise, it is possible to o¤er ex-post inducements
for truthful disclosure without simply incentivizing the underlying criminal activity.
We o¤er the following suggestions for future research. One extension would be to would be to
extend the model to allow for the possible sheltering of interest in o¤shore accounts, alongside
the possibility of tax evasion on the source capital. Second, imperfect verication technology
might be allowed for, as in Rablen (2014). Third, communication between a¤ected investors
through a network, as in Hashimzade et al. (2014), might be introduced. Last, Johannesen et
al. (2018) nd that many US investors did not make use of the 2009 OVDP scheme but chose
to make quiet disclosures through standing voluntary disclosure mechanisms following the
leak of o¤shore data. The model could be extended to allow for this possibility as one of
the investors choices. While each of these avenues must await a dedicated treatment, we
hope to have shed some further light on the economic e¤ects and optimal design of disclosure
schemes.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows immediately from the arguments set out in
the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. As discussed in the text, an investor with an illegal o¤shore
investment will enter the scheme if αO ≥ αS. An investor with a legal o¤shore investment
is indi¤erent between entering and not-entering the scheme, so will enter also. Denote the
expected net revenue raised from investors belonging to TOFF by ROFF (αS, αO, y;φ). Using
the equality in (10) ROFF () writes asZ Z
TOFF
φ{αS1αS≤αO + αO1αS>αO}Q(f, y)− {[1− φ]αS1αS≤αO + αO1αS>αO} c dY dB;
(A.1)
where 1A takes the value one if condition A is true, and the value zero otherwise. Proceeding
by backwards induction, we begin with the tax authoritys choice of {αS, αO}. To deduce
the optimal choice of {αS, αO} we rst consider the optimal choice of αO conditional upon
a given αS. If φ > c/Q(f, y) then verication is strictly gainful for αO < αS. At αO = αS
ROFF (αS, αO, y;φ) jumps upwards discretely, and is then independent of αO on the interval
αO ∈ [αS, 1]. Hence, in this case, ROFF (αS, αO, y;φ) is maximized w.r.t. αO at αO =
αS. If φ ≤ c/Q(f, y) then ROFF (αS, αO, y;φ) is instead decreasing in αO for αO < αS.
Hence, ROFF (αS, αO, y;φ) is maximized w.r.t. αO at either αO = 0 or at αO = αS. To
determine the conditions under which these two local maxima are global maxima note that,
at αO = 0, we have ROFF (αS, 0, y;φ) = 0, and at αO = αS we have ROFF (αS, αS, y;φ) =
αS
R R

OFF

φQ(f, y)− [1− φ] c
	
dY dB. The latter is strictly positive (and therefore the
global maximum) if, at each y, φ > c[c+Q(f, y)]−1. Noting that c[c+Q(f, y)]−1 < c/Q(f, y),
if φ ≤ c[c+Q(f, y)]−1 the global maximum is instead at αO = 0. It therefore holds that
αO (αS;φ)

= 0 if φ ≤ c
c+Q(f,y)
;
= αS otherwise.
(A.2)
It follows from (A.2) that we may rewrite ROFF (αS, αO, y;φ) at the optimal αO as
ROFF (αS, y;φ) =
Z Z
TOFF

φαSQ(f, y)− [1− φ]αSc
	
1φ>c/[c+Q(f,y)] dY dB.
Di¤erentiating ROFF (αS, y;φ) with respect to αS we obtain that
∂ROFF (αS, y;φ)
∂αS
=
Z Z
TOFF
{φQ(f, y)− [1− φ] c}1φ>c/[c+Q(f,y)] dY dB.
If φ is su¢ciently low, i.e., φ ≤ c[c +Q(f, y)]−1 then ∂ROFF (αS, y;φ) /∂αS ≤ 0, so the tax
authority will not verify. It follows that, in this case, ROFF (αS, y;φ) obtains a maximum
at the lowest value of αS consistent with the truthtelling restriction Q(fS, y) = αSQ(f, y).
Hence αS = [1 + f ][1 + f ]−1. If φ > c[c + Q(f, y)]−1 then verication is strictly gainful, so
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ROFF (αS, y;φ) achieves a maximum at αS = 1. Hence
αO (y;φ) =
(
0 if φ ≤ c
c+Q(f,y)
;
1 otherwise;
αS (y;φ) =


1+f
1+f
if φ ≤ c
c+Q(f,y)
;
1 otherwise.
(A.3)
With the nature of enforcement now determined, we analyze the investors investment de-
cision. Expected consumption, conditional upon investing o¤shore illegally with probability
φ ∈ [0, 1], can be written using (A.3) as
CSOFF (φ,w) =
(
[1 + rOFF ] {φ[w − pQ(f, w)] + [1− φ] [1− θ]w} if φ ≤ cc+Q(f,w) ;
[1 + rOFF ]

φ[w − pQ(f, w)] + [1− φ] [1− θ]w
	
otherwise.
(A.4)
The shape of CSOFF (φ,w) as a function of φ has the same qualitative features as the equivalent
function in the absence of a scheme shown in Figure 2. In particular, for φ ≤ c/[c+Q(f, w)]
the investors payo¤ is strictly increasing in φ, as the tax authority cannot credibly commit
to verication. For φ > c/[c + Q(f, w)] the investors payo¤ initially falls discreetly, and
becomes strictly decreasing in φ thereafter, as the tax authority will now verify. It follows
that CSOFF (φ) obtains a maximum in φ at
φ (w) =
c
c+Q(f, w)
. (A.5)
We may now determine equilibrium. Substituting (A.5) into (A.4), equilibrium consumption
when investing o¤shore is
CSOFF (w) =
[1 + rOFF ]w
c+Q(f, w)
{c+ [1− θ]Q(f, w)}. (A.6)
The payo¤ CSOFF (w) in (A.6) to investing o¤shore is strictly preferred to the payo¤ from
investing onshore in (2) if
b <
CSOFF (w)
[1− θ]w
− rON ≡ ~b
S (w) ,
from which the Proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have
φS (w) =
c
c+Q(f, w)
<
c
Q(f, w)
= φNS (w) .
Proof of Proposition 4. The expected proportion of investors with lump-sum w who
invest o¤shore legally, τL (w), and illegally, τ I (w), are given, respectively, by
τ kL (w) =

1− φk

B(~bk (w)); τ kI (w) = φ
kB(~bk (w));
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where k ∈ {NS, S}, and φk is the value of φ in state k. Hence, in aggregate, the expected
proportions of investors choosing each investment type are given byT kON  = R [1− τ kL (w)− τ kI (w)] dW ; T kOFF  = R [τ kL (w) + τ kI (w)] dW ;T kL = R τ kL (w) dW ; T kI  = R τ kI (w) dW.
Expected aggregate net onshore and o¤shore investment are given byONk = [1− θ]Z w[1−B(~bk (w))] dW ;OFF k = Z w{1− θ[1− φk (w)]}B(~bk (w)) dW ;
where the latter may be further decomposed into its legal and illegal components:OFF kI  = Z wφk (w)B(~bk (w)) dW ;OFF kL = [1− θ]Z w[1− φk (w)][1−B(~bk (w))] dW.
Next, we establish that ~bS (w) < ~bNS (w):
~bS (w) < ~bNS (w) ⇔ c+[1−θ]Q(f,w)
c+Q(f,w)
< θc+[1−θ]Q(f,w)
Q(f,w)
;
⇔ Q(f,w)
c+Q(f,w)
> Q(f,w)−c
Q(f,w)
;
⇔ 0 > −c2.
We may now prove the Proposition. (i)
T SOFF  = R B(~bS (w)) dW < R B(~bNS (w)) dW =TNSOFF  and T SON  = 1 − T SOFF  > 1 − TNSOFF  = T SON  ; (ii) T SI  = R φSB(~bS (w))
dW <
R
φNSB(~bNS (w)) dW =
TNSI  but T SL  = R [1 − φS]B(~bS (w)) dW ≷ R [1 −
φNS]B(~bNS (w)) dW =
TNSI  ; (iii) OFF S = R w{1 − θ[1 − φS (w)]}B(~bS (w)) < R w{1 −
θ[1− φNS (w)]}B(~bNS (w)) dW =
OFFNS and ONS = [1− θ] R w[1− B(~bS (w))] dW >
[1− θ]
R
w[1 − B(~bNS (w))] dW =
ONNS ; (iv) OFF SI  = R wφS (w)B(~bS (w)) dW <R
wφNS (w)B(~bNS (w)) dW =
OFFNSI  but OFF SL  = [1− θ] R w[1 − φS (w)]B(~bS (w))]
dW ≷ [1− θ]
R
w[1− φNS (w)]B(~bNS (w))] dW =
OFFNSL .
Proof of Proposition 5. As the choices of investors in TOFF make the tax author-
ity indi¤erent between verifying and not-verifying (both with and without a scheme), it is
straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, RSOFF (y) = R
NS
OFF (y) = 0. Hence, using (5)
and (A.1), we have
RkT =
Z Z
Tk
ON
∪Tk
L
θw dWdB = θ
Z
w[1− φk (w)B(~bk (w))] dW ,
where k ∈ {NS, S}. The result then follows from the inequalities in Proposition 3.
28
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Immediate from (2); (ii) In equilibrium CL = CI −
[1 + rOFF ] θw. Hence COFF
 
φk

= φkCI + [1 − φ
k]{CI − [1 + rOFF ] θw} = CI − [1 −
φk] [1 + rOFF ] θw. It follows that COFF
 
φS

< COFF
 
φNS

⇔ φS < φNS, where the right-
side holds by Proposition 3; (iii) As CON is una¤ected by a scheme, investors who invest
o¤shore in the absence of a scheme but switch to investing onshore in the presence of a
scheme must switch to a lower payo¤.
Proof of Proposition 7. Using the relationship Q(fS, y) = αSQ(f, y) established in (10),
and substituting αS = [1 + f ][1 + f ]−1 from (A.3), the result obtains.
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Figure 1: The o¤shore evasion game in the absence of an o¤shore voluntary disclosure
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Figure 3: The o¤shore evasion game in the presence of an o¤shore voluntary disclosure
scheme.
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